Debating Myself

Champions of the new left in South America (of the Chavez kind) are about to be faced with what seems to be a stark rebuke of leftist policies and Chavez-esque populism. Evo Morales, the populist President of Bolivia and self-appointed champion of indigenous people and the poor, is facing the apparent disintegration of Bolivia.

Residents of Santa Cruz are expected to have approved a state-wide referendum declaring autonomy from the Bolivian central government last Sunday. According to the Washington Post:

Five more of the country’s nine states — including all of those in the eastern lowlands that produce most of the country’s income — are considering similar referendums in coming months.

For those keeping count it could add up to 6 of the country’s 9 states declaring autonomy from the Morales-dominated central government.

Notably, the autonomy referendum does not declare independence. Leaders of the autonomy movement:

simply want more local control over taxes, the courts, property titles and police forces. An autonomous Santa Cruz would remain a part of Bolivia, and its institutions would still be connected to those of the national government.

This will certainly hinder Morales’ plans for a constitutional revision, but they were already in dire shape having been rather undemocratic (this is a favorite move of South American leaders, and even the distinctly un-Chavez leader, Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe, is rumored to be mulling a constitutional revision).

What is interesting to note here is that the issue of devolving power to regional autonomies appears to be an acultural and practically universal phenomenon. From the disintegration of Yugoslavia, to pressures for regional autonomy in Spain, to the long-standing Quebec separatist movement—the nation-state is under significant pressure around the globe.

In this case Bolivia is fitting into a seemingly normal pattern, as the pressure for devolution has divided up along ethnic/culture lines. States with lower populations of indigenous people are feeling threatened by the pro-indigenous policies of Morales, which some have even viewed as racist, and are attempting to separate and avoid conflict. The indigenous people, for their part, feel that Morales is finally representing their interests after a long period of repression and see the autonomy movement as a direct threat.

As one indigenous supporter of Morales put it to the Washington Post:

“They will be killing us — the indigenous — with this statute,” said Alejandro Antezana, who opposes autonomy. “We are going to fight to the death if we have to. We are not going to let them set up their ballot boxes this Sunday, even if that will lead us to confrontation and bloodshed. We have too much to lose.”

In general, if nation-states can’t learn to strike a balance between assimilating and integrating their diverse populations while allowing them to retain their cultural identity, they will always trend toward instability and devolution. The United States has been remarkable in this regard, absorbing millions upon millions of immigrants from diverse places around the globe. Of course, for the United States the assimilation process is lightened because by and large most immigrants choose to immigrate to the United States.

The indigenous population of Bolivia did not choose to immigrate there, or choose to let the Spanish conquistadors in. In that regard perhaps it is more fair to compare the US indigenous populations with those in Bolivia–and of course the US went the route of devolution there by granting Native American tribes significant autonomy (in exchange, of course, for taking all of their land and decimating their population…)

Mixing cultures and ethnic groups under one national government will always prove to be problematic. Bolivia, where the oppressed indigenous peoples finally have power at the national level, is proving that simply giving indigenous peoples power for awhile to run the government also can’t be seen as a solution. Some kind of power sharing, coalition forming, and compromise is needed to ensure stability and a sense of unity.

Unfortunately those words are a lot easier to write than to turn into practical politics.

UPDATE 1: The referendum passed by a margin of 85% in Santa Cruz. This blog post details a lot about the referendum and the electoral process throughout the day.

A major diplomatic breakdown is occurring right now in South America.

Chavez (left) hugs Uribe. Shouldn't Uribe have been worried here?

This story has been relegated to the back burner behind the upcoming Democratic primary on Tuesday, among other stories, but it merits some attention here. I will just list some bullet point facts from various sources to give a sense of what is going on, then we’ll move into some brief, and some [being honest] premature analysis, of the situation:

• Colombia’s military ventured one mile into Ecuadoran territory on Saturday to kill a top FARC rebel commander, Raul Reyes.
• Thousands of Ecuadoran and Venezuelan troops have been ordered to Colombia’s border to show outrage at this incursion.
• Hugo Chavez has expelled the Colombian diplomatic mission from Venezuela.

Is this really a region on the brink of war? No, and several well researched news stories point out the following reasons the conflict is unlikely to escalate militarily:

• Trade—Colombian trade with Venezuela is worth $5 billion a year. Trade to Ecuador tops $2 billion a year, including vital foodstuffs. Colombia also supplies 10 percent of Ecuador’s electricity needs. (Follow the link for some great analysis of economic implications from Bloomberg News)
• Legitimacy of the Raid—Colombia did not raid Ecuador for resources, but to capture (or kill) a top rebel commander. What they found, contained in three encrypted computer discs, was worth well over its weight in gold.
  • “One document, apparently written in February, suggests Venezuela recently gave the rebels $300 million, while another suggests the rebels were shopping for 50 kilos of uranium…”
• Political concerns—This article from Time Magazine does a good job of going through the political implications of any border conflict among the three nations. Most importantly:
  • Colombia can’t afford another front in its perpetual battle against the FARC rebels
  • Chavez can’t afford an unpopular war when he is seeking a constitutional referendum
    • Venezuelan oil industry couldn’t handle the uncertainty a conflict would bring
  • International pressure on both Uribe and Chavez to be civilized
  • The perceived, and perhaps real, military superiority of the veteran Colombian army that has been engaged and active for the past several years against the FARC rebels

So why should we care about a little sabre rattling in South America? For one thing it is of particular interest to the US for a several reasons.

• US dependency on oil—Venezuela crude oil supplies remain important to US energy policy
• Colombia as a key US ally in Latin America
• The US role in training and assisting the Colombian military in its fight against FARC rebels and wider role in the “War on Drugs”
• The role of US intelligence services in the raid into Ecuador
• The longstanding clash between Hugo Chavez and the United States, particularly US President Bush

Chavez holds up his battle plans.

Any conflict, even a minor border skirmish, would pit a major US ally in the region (Colombia) against the fledgling alliance of a major US agitator (Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela). For now the evidence seems to be clearly pointing toward another case of Chavez’s showcase brinkmanship, and in all likelihood tensions should be reduced and relations normalized within the next couple of weeks. However, the taste of this clash may linger (especially the cutting of diplomatic ties, even if only briefly).

The divide between the US friendly Latin American countries and Chavez friendly Latin American countries may have just grown deeper still. The effects of this will be felt for awhile, and is something to monitor considering the persistent US interests in the region outlined above.